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11.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Scope of the Paper
This chapter traces the evolution of land tenure and the existing 
patterns of land distribution. It attempts to identify the major 
tenurial problems found in the five agricultural sub-sectors; the 
LSCF, Communal Areas, State Lands (Forestry, Parks and ARDA), the 
Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas and in Resettlement Areas. 
Following this, the paper briefly reviews government policies 
related to land tenure and attempts to propose alternatives to 
Zimbabwe’s present land tenure malaise.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the macro-level context 
within which proposals, for resolving the tenurial insecurity of 
the Forest Commission, should be made. Specifically the land 
trusteeship role of the state, has led on the one hand, to 
tenurial dualism and insecurity amongst various social groups, 
and indecision on the part of the state with regard to the future 
pattern and processes of land tenure envisaged for the country.
On the other hand, this situation leads itself to a wide range of 
problems, which suggest urgent need for land tenure policy 
reform. These discussions are intended to a clarify the optimal 
tenurial conditions suitable for state enterprises, such as the 
Forestry Commission.
1.2 The Land Tenure Policy Debate Summarised
The major legacy of Zimbabwe’s economic dualism can be found in 
the polarised land property rights, differential access to state 
and private technical and financial resources, and in the 
administrative regulation of landuse, land transfers, population 
movements and enterprise establishment.
A key issue of contention today among various social classes and 
sectoral interests is access to land. The forces expressing 
■concern over land include:— new industrialists, working class 
home-seekers, old and new (white and black) large and small 
farmers, peasants, various disadvantaged women (widows, 
divorcee’s, single women), the aged, migrant farm workers, young 
rural families, environmentalists, an emerging black business 
community and existing state enterprises.
The central 
security of 
concern is 
land owned 
Farm Areas, 
use of some 
commitment 
squatting, 
increasing
issue remains the inequitable access to land and 
tenure among various landholders. A principal 
the currently perceived and at places actual threat to 
by state institutions, large farmers and some Communal 
due to direct demands for and illegal occupation or 
lands. The not yet implemented land redistribution 
announced by the GOZ in 1990, the widespread 
rustling and resource poaching problems, and 
land demands by the black business and farming elites,
2present compelling pressures on the GOZ for a revision of both 
land tenure policy and the present land reform strategy.
Given the apparent national divergence of views on land tenure, 
and a lack of political consensus even among leaders within 
government over land tenure and land distribution, the GOZ plans 
to constitute a land commission to harness consensus on the 
nature of Zimbabwe’s future land tenure. Such a commission is 
intended to make sub-sectoral proposals on land tenure.
Achieving consensus on land tenure is, however, complicated by 
historical grievances over land dispossession, the questionable 
legitimacy of current land ownership and differences over the 
validity of the objectives behind current landuses particularly 
among large landholders. Furthermore, the following sets of 
specific issues tend to cloud consensus over a national land 
tenure system:
1.2.1 Origins of Present Tenure and Land Markets
a) The historical acquisition or alienation of land remains an 
unsettled socio-political grievance.
b) Current land markets originated out of a colonially and 
racially constructed imperfect market, whose access was only 
recently opened. Access is now constrained by imperfect 
capital markets.
c) Actually existing 'communal" tenure is not only a mental 
construct but an artificially created or engineered land 
holding structure, based first on land alienation, second on 
imposition of land trusteeship (to the state and chiefs), 
third on restricted access to non-communal area land markets 
and, crowded by the restricted avenues for the investment of 
black savings from urban or rural incomes.
These issues query the very basis of the present landholding.
1.2.2 Land Management Capacities and Roles
Land tenure tends to be justified in terms of the land management 
roles and contributions, perceived and ■ascribed" to different 
landholders: the state is the protector of nature and sustainable 
user, the LSCF is the agricultural markets provider and the 
communal areas are the subsistence (social security) maintenance 
guarantors (with some "surplus" marketing). In reality, since 
the LSCF and state land users dominate the means of production 
(finance, capital, inputs and expertise), due to either imperfect 
capital markets or direct state financing/subsidies, these two 
uses have a "comparative advantage" in land management, in 
landuse dynamism and in the pioneering "viable" landuses.
3Communal Areas development is corollarily constrained by 
infrastructure and capital markets, resulting in limited land 
development, low level landuse dynamism and a few viable landuse 
ventures. As a result, static landuse modelling dominates the 
design of Communal Area plans and tenurial requirements. Private 
"freedom" of landuse decisions is also mainly a privilege held by 
the LSCF, while the state continues to independently protect land 
and natural resources, and the communal areas are controlled or 
"guided" in their landuses and administration of land access and 
allocations. Thus underlying land management capability 
differences serve to “justify" and/or "legitimise" present land 
tenure patterns and specific tenurial traits.
1.2.3 Land Tenure and Economic Opportunity
The dynamic emergence of new forms of demand for land access and 
use among new landholding aspirants (blacks) and, the viability 
of "new" forms of landuses (wildlife, tourism, "woodlands"), has 
recently created new socio-political pressures for land, while 
the growing unemployed population places new pressures on all 
land tenure structures. The broad legitimacy of all current land 
tenure structures is thus at stake, based on different queries 
concerning each land tenure structure.
1.2.4 Land Tenure, Governance and Sovereignty
Since independence, and with changing political relationships, 
new and old forms of local government and central state 
controls/regulations, dictate tenurial contradictions within each 
land tenure category. This issue previously neglected in land 
policy debate tends to be explosive as shown later. Since the 
centralised state and political machinery, experienced so far are 
themselves open to queries on their legitimacy, and the basic 
resources managed locally are mainly based on land, the land 
tenure issue is central to the issue of decentralisation and 
participatory development and "good government".
Apart from "external" pressures onto each major land tenure 
structure, there are a variety of different landuse, land access, 
land management and administrative contradictions and problems 
emanating from processes within each land tenure category. Thus 
both external and internal problems dictate a review of the land 
tenure system.
The structural adjustment programme (ESAP) recently announced, 
provokes changing attitudes and policy to foreign capital 
generating in turn new views on the regarding and rights for 
foreigners and absolute farmers. A liberal policy towards foreign 
investments in land, urban based access to communal area lands 
and the vertical integration of industry and agriculture is 
essentially dictated by the ESAP’s free market ideology. However 
this evokes problems of equity, Communal Area social security and
4national autonomy. Meanwhile in Communal Areas, “restrictions" 
on external access to land and private property rights, are 
considered to constrain development potentials by some. Here 
still, local autonomy (or sovereignty) in allocating land to 
external aspirants or in determining the land rights of their 
migrant kin,
1.2.5 Landuse Efficiency and Tenure Validity
Lack of consensus on land tenure is also derived from differences 
concerning the role of land use efficiency in determining the 
right to land ownership. Some believe that commodity output 
levels are the key factor to justify land ownership perse, and 
that the best users are located closest to the optimum land 
output potential, while others believe that the best land use can 
only be dictated by land and other market opportunities. Those 
who hold the latter view tend to dispel problems raised by 
imperfection of land and capital markets, and equity 
considerations, while protagonists of the former view would have 
to accept total private land control if the LSCF were found to be 
closest to the optimum use on all their lands. Peasants are 
considered better users of "under-utilised" arable lands 
(woodlands and wildlife), even on the basis of maize and cotton 
by some, but are seen by others to be sub-optimal landusers, due 
to low yields, low level export cropping and their lack of output 
diversification. Equally, some contend that Zimbabwe's peasants 
are environmental liabilities, and therefore, that they should 
not have access to more land, and that they should be regulated 
in detail on their land uses.
The above issues indicate that Zimbabwe’s land tenure policy 
problem is not simply a matter of choosing among free-hold, 
"communal", state and private land ownership. It is a problem 
which, but spans the broader questions of land administration, 
access, local control, access to finance and so forth. A brief 
review of the evolution of land tenure in Zimbabwe provides the 
necessary background on how conflicts over land tenure actually—  
arose.
2.0 THE EVOLUTION OF ZIMBABWE’S LAND TENURE
2.1 Introduction
The centrality of land tenure or land distribution cannot be 
over-emphasised in the polity of Zimbabwe. It has been topical 
from the advent of colonialism in the 1890s. Colonisation 
resulted in the forced alienation of land from the indigenous 
African to the white "pioneers". In the post-independence era 
the land issue still draws its significance from the fact that 
over 7Ox of the total population live directly off the land and 
most of the economy’s industrial development depends on the 
strength of the agricultural sector.
5In order to better appreciate the existing land tenure problem, 
it is essential to understand that broad quality of Zimbabwe’s 
land and the history of land tenure changes.
2.2 Land Quality Patterns
A critical feature of Zimbabwe’s land tenure situation is the 
quality of land available to different groupings with differing 
landuse objectives. Currently, Zimbabwe is divided into five 
natural regions on the basis of soil type, rainfall and other 
climatic factors (see Map 1). The types and value of farm output 
in Zimbabwe varies significantly among these five natural 
regions, whose features are:
Region I: This is a specialised and Diversified Farming Region, 
of about 700,000 ha. Rainfall is relatively high with more than
1.000 mm per annum of precipitation in low lying areas with an 
altitude of lower than 1,700 m and more than 900 mm per annum at 
greater altitudes: Precipitation is received in all months of 
the year. Relatively low temperatures and high rainfall enable 
forestation, fruit and intensive livestock production. In frost- 
free areas plantation crops such as tea, coffee and macadamia 
nuts are possible.
Region II: This region is characterised by Intensive Farming. 
Rainfall is moderately high (750-1,000 mm), but is confined to 
the summer months. Two sub-regions have been defined within this 
region. Sub-region IIA receives an average of at least 18 rainy 
pentads per season and is normally reliable, rarely experiencing 
severe dry spells in summer. The region is suitable for 
intensive crop or livestock farming systems. Sub-region IIB 
receives an average of 16-18 pentads per season, but is subject 
to severe dry rainy seasons. Crop yields are affected in certain 
years, but not frequently enough to justify shifting cropping 
practices away from intensive farming systems.
Region III: Semi-Intensive Farming is practised in this region 
(7,290,000 ha.). Precipitation is moderate (650-800 mm), but its 
effectiveness is limited by severe mid-season dry spells and high 
temperatures. Conditions for growing maize, tobacco and cotton 
production have marginal. Livestock production, fodder crop 
farming and the farming of cash crops with good moisture 
retention are the suitable farming systems in the region.
Region IV: This is a Semi-Extensive Farming Region of about
14,780,000 ha. Rainfall is relatively low (450-600 mm) and is 
subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells 
during the rainy season. Low and uncertain rainfall make cash 
cropping risky except for drought-resistant crops and soils with 
better water retention. Farming systems are suited to livestock 
production with some intensification possible with drought-
6resistant dodder crops.
Region V : This is an Extensive Farming Region with an area of 
about 10,440,000 ha. Rainfall is too low and erratic for 
reliable production of even drought-resistant fodder and grain 
crops. Included in this region are areas below 900 m altitude, 
where the mean rainfall is below 650 mm in the Zambezi Valley and 
below 600 mm in the Sabi-Limpopo valleys. Cattle or game 
ranching are best suited farming system of the region.
While natural regions now form the basis of land use planning in 
most Government Ministries, official data on land use patterns by 
natural region have only been available since 1987, and then only 
for the large-scale commercial sector.
2.3 The Evolution of Land Tenure: Salient Aspects
The process of land alienation which led to the present patterns 
of land tenure is well documented in various historical studies.1 
Some crucial features of the process are that land alienation was 
mainly phased over a 55 year period between 1910 and 1965.
Whereas by 1911, the communal areas held only approximately 22* 
of Zimbabwe’s land, with the ESAP land company holding 50* of the 
land (under some variant of "state" property), private white 
individuals held 20* of the land. By 1931, whites held 50* of 
the land under freehold, while the state held approximately 23* 
of the land, small-scale commercial (black) farm areas held 5* 
and the communal areas held 22* of the land.
By 1965, however, the Communal Area’s now held approximately 40* 
of the land, Purchase Areas (black small-scale farm areas) below 
3* and the state held approximately 15* while the large private 
farmers held 45* of the land. As shown later, through 
resettlement and other forms of land transfers distribution of 
land tenure changed drastically during the 1980s. Up until 
today, the bulk of Zimbabwe’s high quality land remained in white 
or state hands.
Land tenure patterns in Zimbabwe have changed thus frequently, 
over 15 year cycles, with the key variation being first massive 
disposition of peasants, who were to be returned "new" lands by 
the state as population and political pressures mounted. The 
state played a key landholding and allocation role, distributing 
land between peasants, black small-scale commercial farmers and 
large white farmers. Lands held by the state were at times held 
as '‘unassigned", reserved for forests and nature, leased out to 
commercial and small farmers, held as urban land, and/or used for
Moyo, S. (1987) "The Land Question" in Mandaza I (ed.), 
The Political Economy of Transition in Zimbabwe. 
(COOESERIA).
7state agricultural development (under ARDA’s predecessors). The 
Rhodesian and Zimbabwean states thus played the role of real 
estate agent and trustee for the various social groups, with 
prospective white land seekers maintaining the privilege of 
access to and freehold property in land.
Indeed the colonial state attempted to create a small class of 
landed black small-scale commercial farmers, under a Native 
Purchase Area scheme. Leases-to-buy were offered to such blacks 
from among their "elite" while little technical and financial 
support, compared to that offered the whites was provided to 
them. This scheme had limited impact as shown later.
Furthermore, land tenure changes also occurred, (through colonial 
resettlement schemes, between 1930 and 1975, when over 120,000 
families were resettled mainly from the dry southern provinces 
(Masvingo and Midlands areas) to the north-western and northern 
provinces, Gokwe areas, Mashonaland Central and West. Moreover, 
during this period up until today, private household 
"resettlement" into communal areas, of an unknown quantity 
occurred in the same regions, through local chiefs allocating 
soliciting households land. These tenure processes created a 
land transfer tradition that has received little official and 
academic attention over the years. Only recently has the media, 
scholars and the state begun to take note of related tenure 
issues.
For instance, the casually treated Communal Area discourse, 
concerning "outsiders", "foreigners", new migrants, is a long­
standing area of conflicts in communal areas based on over 30 
years of tenure bidding within receiving provinces. Here the 
role of the state as mediator, trustee or real estate agent, has 
tended to be marginal, and not recognised by chiefs, while new 
district councils with land administration rights in Communal 
Areas have faced critical resistance from local elites in dealing 
with land allocation. Also, the fact that chiefs and headman
have been known to receive "gifts" or money for such -lend---------
allocations has only recently been noted, and described by some 
academics (Cheater 1990, Bruce 1991) as a form of land sales. 
Little attention has been given to quantifying the administrative 
and implementation costs of such land transfer processes. The 
pre-occupation by some academics seems to have been mainly to 
establish the existence of a history among black Zimbabweans 
(including those in Communal Areas) of an ideology and material 
quest for private landed property and land markets.
The tenurial issue here is that, inspite of the pivotal real 
estate role that the state has always played, there has been a 
significant evolution of locally managed land tenure 
administration and distribution within Communal Areas. Also, 
this process has produced different forms of conflict, 
ideological discourse and, pressures for natural resources as
8noted elsewhere.2
In discussing the evolution of land tenure, it is also crucial to 
note that, since the 1930s, due to the emergence white 
environmentalism related to fears of soil erosion, a range of 
landuse controls and regulations emerged in Zimbabwe.
Essentially, centrally directed controls and regulations, 
administered by white district officers and collaborating 
chiefs/headman, generated an ethic of political resistance due to 
the distortion of basic security of land tenure in Communal 
Areas.
The enforcement, first (1920s) of physical bunding and other soil 
conservation measures, including forced tree and plantation 
establishment, and then later (1950s) of landuse reorganisation, 
through the Land Husbandry Act, (see the present Agritex landuse 
planning model(s), led to widespread insecurity of land tenure 
within Communal Areas, and among urban workers dependent on and 
expecting to retire in Communal Area farming. Conservation 
works, crop husbandry "recommendations" and landuse 
reorganisation, not only compelled additional labour allocations 
in Communal Areas, but imposed restrictions on the landuse rights 
of peasants. This process generated changes in the land tenure 
norms within the so-called "Communal" tenure systems, nationally 
based land tenure insecurity among blacks and resistance to land 
management programmes.
The liberation war, increased population and growing movements of 
households between Communal Areas, generated new political and 
administrative demands for land access, security of tenure, and 
controls over landuse. As discussed elsewhere, resettlement and 
the promotion of Communal Areas maize and cotton production, and 
marketing were the major response of the GOZ. These responses 
were inadequate, while security of tenure emerged as a problem 
not only in Communal Areas, but also in the LSCF and state lands 
threatened by squatters and poachers.
3.0 EXISTING PATTERNS OF LAND TENURE
3.1 Introduct i on
As a result of the broad evolution of land tenure discussed 
above, the following patterns of land tenure pertains in 
Zimbabwe.
See ZERO 1987 on "Resource Sharing" and, C. Nhira and 
Fortman (1991).
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93.2 Land Classification by Farm Category and Region
Of the 39 million hectares surface of colonial Rhodesia, the Land 
Tenure Act (1969) had set aside about 18 million hectares each 
for Africans and Europeans. In the European areas about 15.6 
million hectares were allocated for farming, where the land was 
privately owned, and individuals or companies (both local and 
transnational) could have title to the land. Since independence, 
land categories have been redefined as the large-scale commercial 
sector (LSCS), small-scale commercial sector (SSCS), communal 
areas (CA), resettlement areas (RA) and state lands (see Table 
1 ).
A. Communal Areas
Formerly the "native and special native reserves’" and then 
"tribal trust lands", the communal areas now account for 16.A 
million ha or 42* of land in Zimbabwe. 74.2* of these areas are 
located in the poorest rainfall zones of Natural Regions IV and 
V. Communal Area population in 1988 was 5.1 million persons and 
1,020,400 households, representing a population density of about 
31.1 persons per square kilometre.
B . Large-Scale Commercial Sector
Formerly the European areas, this sector comprises around 4,660 
large commercial farms on about 11.2 million ha (29 percent). 
These farms employed 227.6 thousand permanent and casual workers 
in 1988. Population stood at 1,571.3 thousand in 1982 with a 3.0 
percent growth rate. Freehold title to the land in the LSCS is 
governed by the Roman-Dutch Law of the Cape Colony of 1891 as 
amended. Farmers are represented by the Commercial Farmers’
Union, and include both black and white membership (the majority 
being white).
The average farm size in the large scale commercial farming areas 
— is 2 hectares nationw ide~~wtTi-le individual farms average 1,402
ha/farm. Up to 34.6* of this land is in Natural Regions I and II, 
21.5* in III and 43.9* in Regions IV and V (see Table 1).
c. Small-Scale Commercial Sector
Formerly called African Purchase Areas, the SSCS encompasses 
1,238.7 thousand hectares located mainly in natural regions III 
(35.4%) and IV (38.2%). The sector comprises 8,653 farms on an 
area of 1,074,767 hectares, with an average farm size of 124.2 
ha/farm. Of this total, 564.8 thousand hectares were allocated 
under agreements of lease and purchase, and 484.0 thousand 
hectares were deeds of grant and transfers. This leaves 379.8 
thousand hectares, of which 177.4 thousand hectares were taken 
over for resettlement by 1985, leaving around 202.4 thousand 
hectares still vacant and unallocated.
D. Resettlement Areas
The Land Resettlement Programme was initiated in 1980 to redress 
inequalities in land distribution, improve the productive 
agricultural base among smallholders and to alleviate population 
pressure in the CAs. The Government's initial goal was to 
resettle approximately 17,500 families on about 1.2 million 
hectares of LSCS land over a five-year period. In 1982, the 
targeted number of settlers was raised to 162,000 families on 10 
million hectares of land.
E. State Farming Areas
Within commercial farming, the State has been involved in direct 
productive farming even prior to independence. Currently, it is 
farming on 353,006 ha made up of 18 farming operations ranging 
from horticultural, milk, beef and grain (wheat) production.
The operations are run by a parastatal - the Agricultural 
Development Authority (formerly Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority). Its mandate was to operate farms so as 
to ensure national food security and also promote rural
development by venturing into farming enterprises in outlying 
areas that did not attract other commercial investors. The 
parastatal has been involved in the implementation of the Model C 
type of settlement - to take account of specialised crop 
production like tea, coffee, wheat and milk production amongst 
peasant out-growers. It has also been using newly purchased 
resettlement land whilst plans are being finalised. The pilot 
Model D Resettlement Programme is also being implemented by the 
Agricultural Development Authority.
F. State Forests and Plantations and Parks Areas
As detailed in chapter 1, the Zimbabwean state holds title to 20% 
of Zimbabwe's land, which is managed by the Forest Commission (a 
parastatal) and the National Parks Authority (a Government 
department). For the Forestry Commission this entails 15(?)
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TABLE 2: OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Type of Ownership Number 
of Farms
Tota 1 
Area
Average 
Farm Size
Individual Ownership 2,739 3,841,050 1,402
Company 1 , 784 6,842,259 3,835
Central Government 33 54,513 1 ,652
Local Government 4 14,304 3,576
Parastatal 18 353,006 19,611
Cooperatives 10 10,422 1 ,042
Other 72 97,832 1 , 359
TOTAL 4,660 1 1,213,386 2,406
Source: Central Statistical Office.
TABLE 1: LAND DISTRIBUTION BY FARM SECTOR AND NATURAL REGION, 1988 
( ’000 ha)
Natural
Raglon
C o a m u n a 1* 
Araas
Larga-Scala*
CoMaarclal
Faras
S « a 11-Seals 
Coaasreial 
Faras
c
Rasattlaaant
Araas
d Parks 
Stats Fra*s* Wildlifs
a n d f
Araas Othar^ Total Araa h
___ ibsl___ 1X1- ---- ihsi__ __ ill___ -i bs l__ _iXl__ -i b& l__ — IX1__ .ibsl__1X1_ ____ibsl. --1X1- ..ibsl. ___ 1X1— ____ ibsl_____ -1X1
I 135,0 0,8 202,2 1 ,8 7,3 0,6 30,0 0,9 10,0 2,0 50,1 1 .0 265.4 17,8 • 700,0 1 .6
II 1 270,0 7,8 3 887,0 32,8 222,2 17,9 590,0 17,9
©CMoo 25,0 0,5 55,8 3,7 5 880,0 15,0
III 2 820,0 17,2 2 405,4 21,5 438,3 35,4 1240,0 37,6 160,0 32,0 545,9 11,0 -319,8 -21.4 7 290,0 18.7
IV 7 340,0 44,9 2 429,1 21,7 473,3 38,2 610,0 24,6 60,0 12,0 2514,1 50,3 1153,5 77,2 14 780,0 37.8
__fl_____ _4_Iflflu.A_2flu.a_— 2_4flflul_ _22u.2___ _fll.ifl_- _fl2fluH__lftu.fl__2flflu.fl_52j.fl_ lfliflafl-_3Iu2_ _aaa.il-.22*1___.lfl_44Qu.fi___ .2ftu.2
IQIflL__ ia.a5a.ifl_______ -11 2I3^4_ _ ______ 1.21 Ax l_______ a _2afl^fl_ 4flflu.ft_ _ .lflZflxl- 14fllu.ft_ _2fl A2flu.fl___
a. Adapted fro* Chavunduka (1982) and Statistical Yearbook (1987).
b. C90 data as of 3spts*b#r 30, 1988; axcludas 198,082 ha of fara* that art Inactlv*.
c. Bassd on data by natural ragions in Wslnsr at al. (1985, p.259) loss arias acqulrad for ra sa tt1a*ant-V u t 1 (29,856
ha, NR II), Chonjlrl (58,871 ha, NR III), Coppar Quaan (40,958 ha In NR III and 48,342 ha In NR IV), and Mahauasha
(1,381 ha, NR IV).<Ths total araas Includaa approxlaataly 230,000 ha not yat sattlad (MLARR).
d. 2,743,3 ha acqulrad for raaattlaaant from 1979/60 to 1988/89 plua 543,7 fro* foraar atata land (MLARR).
a. ADA astatas hold 498,535 ha 1n 1988/89 (ADA Planning Unit).
f. Adaptad fro* Chavunduka (1982) and Annax C.
g. Diffaranca bitxaan su* of land acroas tanura catagorias and total land a n a .
h. Fro* 1 987 Statistical Yaarbjook (p. 141).
1. Parcantagaa ara of coluan tlatais.
T A B L E  3: EFFICIENCY OF A R A B L E  LAND USE FOR CROP PRODUCTION
Total Arable Arable Crop Aread Cropping Net Arable Net Cropping Adjusted* Adjusted
Area Land Land P 1 anted Efficiency Land Efficiency Crop Area Crop Eff.
.ifififi.bfti -iQQQ_b*l_ — i l l — --- lQQQ_t)6l— ______ill----- — ifififi-bftl*._________ 1*1______ iQQQ-bftl _ ---- 1*A_
A 8 C = B/A D EsO/B F OsO/F H I =H/F
Mashonaland West 1988,0 760,6* 40,3 184,6 24,3 650,3 29,4 270,2 4 1,6
M a e h o n a 1 and Central 732,6 307,3* 41,9 105,4 34,3 262,7 40,1 152,7 58,1
Mashonaland East 957,8 522,1* 54 ,5 97 ,6 18,7 446,4 2 1,9 139,1 31.2
NR X* 202,2 27,9 13 ,8b 11.7 39,7 23,9 49,0 12.1 50,6
NR II 3 886,9 1 047,1 28 , 4 379,1 36,2 895,3 42,3 556,0 62,1
NR III 2 405,4 574 ,9 23,9 48,4 8,4 491,5 9,9 74.9 15.2
NR IV 2 429 , 1 10 ,1c 0,0 8,9 88,1 10,1 88,1 10,2 101,0
tifi- .2 ___ f l - t f l  — ______12.^_____ _______________ lQ2.il_______________ 51-lQ_____---- aa^i_ _ ______
a. Fro* Walnar at a 1. ( 1 985 ) less land acquired for r e s e t t l e n e n t , attualnj that 1988 totals contain the sane
proportion of arable and non-arable land aa 1n 1991.
b. Percentages for natural regions are adapted fro* Vincent. Thomas and Staples (1982, p.170).
c. A r able land 1e I r r i g a b l e  land times a c r o p p i n g  i n t e n s i t y  of two.
d. Crop area In 1989-99, CSO.
a. A r able land leea 10 p e r c e n t  for s q u a r i n g  of f i e lds, t r e e  lines, roads, h o o e s t e a d s  a n d  p o c k e t s  of I n a c c e s s i b l e
land, and lees 5 p e r cent for M e c h a n i c a l  c o n s e r v a t i o n  Measures, 
f. Crop area a d j u s t e d  to Incl u d e  r e e o M n e n d e d  fall o w  r o t a t i o n s .
T A B L E  4: G R A Z I N G L A N O  E F F I C I E N C Y
Total Crop Araa Crop Araa U n u s a b 1 a
Araa Plantad Lass Foddsr Land
(000 ha) (000 ha) (000 hs) (000 ha)
A B C 0
Man 1c a 1 and 760,7 43,6 40,0 152,1
M a s h o n a 1 and 3576,5 387,7 343,2 715,2
Midlands 1689,1 18,1 15,6 337,8
M a t v 1ngo 2406,7 41,8 40,7 481,3
Matabslaland 2760,4 '9,4 6,8 556,1
NR I 202,2 11 ,7 10,5 40,4
NR II 3686,9 379,2 334,1 737,4
NR III 2405,5 48,4 43,3 481,1
NR IV 2429,1 8,9 5,2 485,8
tifi 2489.7 52*4 52.2 451*5____
NAI1QNAL 11 213.4 500.6 446.3 .2 24 2* 5____
Grazing L 1vaatock Q r a z 1ng
Araa Units Araa/LSU
(000 ha) (000 L 8 U ) (ha/LSU)
E=A-C-D F G = E/F
508,6 67,5 8,4
2 518,1 570,9 4,4
1 335,7 215.8 6,2
1 884,7 153.5 12,3
2 217,5 254.4 8,7
15 1,3 23.3 0,5
2 015,4 545,3 4,8
1 881,1 295.7 6,4
1 937,1 196,0 6,5
i_aaaxZ— __lfilx.2_________iax2__
Low RUk Mod. RUk M'9h 
9 t o c k < R 9  S t o c k i n g  S t o c k i n g
Strategy strategy 3trat#9y
ituzkaiu___mazkaui--- xtuzkaui
H I J
3-4 2 i
3-4 2 i
0-8 3-4 2
8-10 4-5 3
lfl-14----- _a-a----_____ 1
a.aaiafi— 1-aaa^.i----------a^a
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plantations each with an average size o f ........... hectares,
located mostly (80%) in Manicaland province, and 15(?) forest 
areas (indigenous woodland reserves),
averaging............. hectares each, located mostly (80%) in
Matebeleland North province. Although centrally planned managed 
institution, the Forestry Commission has individual managers on 
each of the plantations with restricted autonomy regarding 
operational plans and landuse (!). The indigenous estates are 
also collectively managed by a divisional manager guided by 
centrally derived plans.
The Parks Authority holds 10 (?) parks located mainly in 
Matebeleland Province and these are centrally controlled with 
individual managers. The individual parks have large areas 
leased out for tourist exploitation to private operators, while 
Parks staff maintain and control resources use.
Both the Forestry Commission and Parks Authority are in turn 
"leasees" through legislation enabling them to manage and utilise 
the lands within their purview, but do not have lease contracts 
let alone title deeds. The Forestry Commission has in the recent
past bought some land, only.............. hectares on a title deeds
basis, but this constitutes less than 1% of their lands. These 
state lands are mostly surrounded by Communal Areas as shown for 
the Forestry Commission in Chart 1.
As can be seen, the Forestry Commission is surrounded by 100,000 
(?) families spread around 15 districts in mainly two provinces. 
Furthermore, the Forestry Commission and the Communities have 
different "resource sharing" arrangements (Chart 1). With the 
communities, ranging from leases, resource poaching, squatting, 
extension etc. This suggests a diverse and thinly spread 
exposure of the Forestry Commission to local communities and 
equally a diversity of forms of relationships cultivated by the 
Forestry Commission. The above features define the real form of 
land tenure and problems confronting the Forestry Commission.
The Parks however, tend to be surrounded more by lands belonging 
to the Forestry Commission, LSCF and District Councils, than by 
actual communities i.e. Communal Areas. However, the parks also 
face poaching from both professionals and a few communities.
District Lands
In addition, districts control woodland lands in Communal Areas, 
of as yet unspecified quantities. These are also increasing 
through the Campfire programme as shown in Chart 2. The main 
tenurial issue here is the conflict between District Councils and
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actual communities,1 over whom actually holds the tenure. 
Officially some of these lands are "Communal" while other are 
"district" lands (I) .
In the section that follows, we now identify some of the land 
tenure problems found within the different agricultural sub­
sectors.
4.0 LAND TENURE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SUB-SECTORAL
4.1 Land Tenure Specificities
The above national and therefore broad and general land tenure 
problems discussed above have a variegated expression within each 
of the agricultural sub-sectors. The sub-sectoral specificity of 
tenure problems arises, first out of the variations in the 
quality of land available to various groups within each sub­
sector, leading therefore to competing interests over land access 
and landuse. Secondly, tenure problems derive a specificity 
because the number of sizes and management capabilities of 
landholders within each sub-sector varies substantially 
reflecting the evolving process of social and agrarian 
differentiation. The later is based on the accumulation of 
capital, skills, opportunity and power relations, to which access 
is unequal. Agrarian differentiations has led to competing 
perceptions and demands for tenurial rights and obligations.
Thirdly, the shifting basis of the national ruling class, from 
colonial then white minority and then black majority rule, has 
resulted in a changing land tenure ideology, and a shift in the 
constituencies attended to by the state. This in itself forms a 
basis for new forms of tenurial problems derived from shifting 
state interventions in the land markets, legislation and in 
landuse regulations.
Fourthly, temporal changes in demography, economic strategy,
market "opportunities", technology___ available,____ financial
allocations, and environmental norms, have led to new and varied 
demands within each sub-sector, in terms of land tenure or 
access, needs and rights and obligation.
Some of the specific problems that have accumulated in the main 
sub-sectors are discussed below.
1 C. Nhira and L. Fortman (1991).
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'.2 Communal Area's Tenure Issues
® ‘.2.1 Official Concerns with Communal Areas Land Tenure
Official concern with Communal Area land tenure admits a wide 
range of inadequately specificied tenurial problems related to 
social, institutional, administrative and legal issues.2 Even 
■ore elusive is the G O Z 's concern with "... existing communal land 
practices..." related to "...the distinctions and 
interrelationships between problems of settlement, arable and 
grazing units." Evidently the key elements of GOZ Communal Area 
concern include the:
, i) need for recommendations aimed at resolving problems of 
"...management of common resources and instituting rational 
landuse planning in Communal Areas."3
ii) "...recommendations of alternative production-oriented land 
tenure systems, that are sustainable and backed by viable 
legal and institutional arrangements capable of 
administering the suggested form of land rights." These 
recommendations should account for local level institutions 
(Wardco's etc.) and review the District Council and 
Provincial Administrative Acts, in relation to the role of 
chiefs in land allocation.4
iii) To make recommendations on absentee farmers, womens land 
rights, alternative social security for formal employees.5
These concerns reflect a wide range of problems and 
contradictions discussed below.
4.3 The Specific Land Tenure Problems in Communal Areas
4.3.1 The Basis for Communal Area Land Demands
A fundamental issue concerning the Communal Area land tenure is 
the extreme variation in the kinds of problems arising in the 
different 100 plus (?) Communal Areas, and variations in terms of 
land demands and problems related to agricultural, woodlands and 
"urban" lands, and different problems facing different classes of
2 GOZ, (August 1991), "Terms of Reference for the
Proposed Land Tenure Commission", p.3.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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land aspirants and holders.
Thirteen different classes or social groups can be distinguished
in terms of land demands and problems namely:
i) landless mainly young households;
ii) established groups of households with diminishing or small 
crop lands (below 2 hectares) especially in dryland areas 
(Natural Region II, IV and V);
iii) communities with access to diminished grazing lands,m due to 
cropland or household land expansion;
iv) groups of households demanding or aspiring for, and/or 
competing for small areas of irrigated, irrigable, dam cr 
stream-banks and borehole serviced lands;
v) establish "kulaks" (better-off peasants) seeking crop and/or 
grazing lands for production expansion;
vi) groups of kulaks, communities and individuals looking for 
title to agricultural and residential lands in some Communal 
Areas;
vii) black urban based elites and rural-based elites, black 
trusts, formal black business enterprises and formal white- 
owned business concerns (e.g. the various supermarkets), 
seeking freehold title to land in Growth Points;
viii) District councils, and Wardco's and NGOs or Trusts seeking 
land tenure rights for community income-generating projects 
(e.g. dams, Campfire, irrigation, woodlots), services (e.g. 
schools etc.) and for environmental preservation.
ix) state institutions seeking land for national development, 
services and environmental projects;
x) migrant peasants seeking new agricultural sites in land- 
surplus Communal Areas;
xi) migrant workers in urban towns seeking to retain land rights 
for agricultural use through direct own split-household 
based farming or indirectly through defacto grazing rights 
secured through the extended family;
xii) retiring urban workers seeking social security in Communal 
Area farming.
xiii) "foreign" migrant workers seeking homes for retirement and 
social security in land.
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I
r the quantity of households or individuals falling in these 
; has not been established such that the magnitude of 
ires or demands for associated land rights, and the extent 
igations of various Communal Area councils to meet these 
s is unclear. As a matter of principle, however, the GOZ 
authorities and local leadership have yet to decide on the 
macy of land rights demands and the dispensing of the 
s obligations. At any rate the magnitude of pressures 
substantially among the Communal Areas depending also on 
Leal process, land availability, land quality and the 
“•♦"re of social deprivation in question.
11.3.2 Land as Collateral Base
The most vocal demand currently is that for access to freehold in 
Growth Points by black business elites, who are essentially the 
major "notables" and influential at the district and provincial 
? levels. Backed by the current ESAP free market ideology and 
i campaign for developing black entrepreneurs, this most educated 
and monied classes vociferously express their land demands. It 
is reported that accountability or fair play allocating plots at 
jrowth points is at stake, given cases of monopoly over political 
power and finances to purchase and/or lease plots. The question 
)f need for land property for collateral has escalated these 
pressures.
However, it is not surprising that given the price escalation of 
both farm and rural centre lands within LSCF and "urban" areas, 
that black business has had to resort to rapid land marketeering 
in the Communal Areas. Apparently, the shortage of GOZ or 
district council surveyors remains the key bottleneck to rural 
centre or growth points land markets development.
Inspite of the cheaper land prices in Communal Areas, there is 
also pressure from chiefs and other local leaders that benefits 
from (or payments for) such land transfers be accrued directly to 
local communities (and/or chiefs) rather than to district 
councils. The present demand is also for chiefs and other local 
leaders to control the whole process of rural centre land 
allocation. The main question remains to what extent the more 
ordinary peasants benefit from these new land markets.
Even so, land tenure and transfer policy debates regarding 
Communal Area land markets are constrained by the absence of land 
and property valuation data and/or records on normatively based 
rights and values. Land pricing tends to be based on thumb­
sucking in growth points1
4.3.3 Tenure Insecurity in Communal Areas
Insecurity of tenure is experienced by all the various classes or 
social groups, identified form of title, competition over land
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access rights, diminishing land quality, ambiguity over the 
control of the land allocation process and landuse regulations by 
various state institutions.
■ Whereas current legislation enshrine the rights of the President, 
the Minister of Local Government and District Councils in 
Communal Area land allocation, ambiguity over the relative powers 
of these three authorities is to be found in the legislation and 
from practices. Recent moves to re-assign an advisory and/or 
influential role to chiefs in the land allocation have only 
served to confuse issue, even if they politically appeasing the 
chiefs.
Rural communities contest the authority of all four authorities 
in the land allocation process, while the defacto permanent 
ownership by households of cropping land and the inability of 
local authorities to enforce landuse regulations or restrict 
access to grazing lands, suggest that current legislation is in 
fact irrelevant. However, lack of freehold or leasehold title 
tenure in Communal Areas, while supposedly protecting the poor 
from further land alienation does effectively restrict commercial 
land transactions. Insecurity of tenure remains because of the 
conflicting legislation, landholding norms and rising demand for 
land allocations.
Land transfers through inheritance are a common feature of 
Communal Areas tenure although legislation does not assume or 
recognise this process. While land in heritance needs formal 
recognition, major problems arise out of the inheritance rights 
of female spouses, female heirs and competing male heirs, 
particularly in land short areas. Lack of land for allocation to 
all adult heirs apparent living in the Communal Areas, and lack 
of clarity among various heirs is a major source of land tenure 
insecurity in Communal Areas.
Gender based and rights are also vague in terms of unmarried 
women, divorcee's and married women requiring land for individual 
agricultural landuses. Land rights to women remain linked to 
partriachy (fathers, husbands, uncles and even mature sons). 
Whereas married and young women may "decide" garden plots from 
husband, fathers or local leaders, this right is neither assured 
not satisfactory.
These issues have yet to receive significant advocacy from rural 
women, as much of the articulation remains isolated, dominated by 
intellectuals and a handful of the few female political 
activists. The GOZ or ruling party has yet to take a firm stand 
on female land rights in Communal Areas, while most land analysts 
neglect women's land rights.
An additional source of Communal Areas tenurial insecurity arises 
from current landuse regulations administered by local councils,
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Forestry Commission and Parks authorities, Agritex and the land 
inspectorate of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism.
Regulations related to landuse planning include villagisation, 
environmental conservation practices particularly in relation to 
\ access to trees and wildlife, and soil erosion measures, 
cultivation, grazing areas and stocking levels, are mostly 
centrally delineated with little local level consultation or 
acceptance. Moreover the scientific validity of many such 
regulations is doubted by many scientists and local communities. 
Moreover the extension and enforcement procedures are not locally 
acceptable.
Fundamentally the absence of local sanction towards the
regulations and popular questions about their legitimacy, are 
indicative of land tenure interventionism by the state. Land 
held by the communities is seen to be restricted from them in 
terms of its use and rights of exploitation of the fruits of the 
land. Where the "fruits" of the land are crucial to community 
survival or reproduction, and where land is short and alternative 
land allocations are unavailable, such state directed 
restrictions amount to infringements on basic rights to survival 
and to community property.
Conflicts between state and community, and straight rejection of 
landuse regulations reflect the inadequacy for irrelevance 
present landuse administration and regulation. In fact these 
conflicts underpin the basic tenurial insecurity found among 
Communal Area households. The lack of full-scale popular backing 
of resettlement and landuse planning by an elected government, is 
indicative of a long heritage of land tenure insecurity based on 
widespread land regulations and restrictions.
But '’informal" allocation of Communal Areas lands by chiefs, 
local leaders of local councils to migrant external to the 
communities (e.g. Gokwe and other Communal Areas) as well as
state resettlement schemes__in Communal Areas (e.g. the Mid-
Zambezi Resettlement Scheme), seem to generate different forms of 
Communal Area tenurial insecurity. Conflicts over which among 
the state, local councils, traditional leaders or WARDCOS has 
legitimate authority for such land allocations abounds, and is 
compounded by the role and interests of political and business 
leadership.
Local insecurity arises out of the land rights reserved for 
community offspring in future, current rights of first refusal to 
preferred land plots, the social incohesion in landuse arising 
from migrants, and the right to compensation and payments for 
land "expropriation" by the state or "outsiders".
Land tenure insecurity here is based on uncertainty over present 
and future cost-benefit streams from land, as well as insecurity
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over local administrative autonomy and local resources control 
rights. Local land control is the key material basis for any 
form of decentralised or power-sharing government. However, 
parochial political tendencies are themselves a threat to broader 
land tenure security within Communal Areas, since at times ad hoc 
and "illegal" group arrogation of land rights, including so- 
called squatting, tend at times to be sanctioned by local 
political leadership. Unsystemasized land allocation processes 
tend to be met, however, with exaggerated state force, such that 
the current practices of land control and litigations tends to 
lack popular legitimation.
4.3.4 Group Land Rights and Tenure
A question that remains unsettled and a source of land tenure 
insecurity is the degree to which group rights to grazing land is 
universally desired in Communal Areas. Whereas very few studies 
note a trend towards individualising pieces of grazing land.6 and 
others note cropping invasion of grazing lands by households 
tendency for most scientists is to recommend privatising the 
grazing areas. A few scientists for common-property management 
regimes with restrictions against open-access in the grazing 
lands, are desirable in Communal Areas.7
GOZ officials and colonial regimes on the other hand have always 
leased towards introducing controlled communal grazing schemes 
with a disastrous record in the Communal Areas. The precise 
reasons espoused for the failure of such schemes are debateable. 
Also, the fact that the privatisation or individualisation of 
grazing holdings may lead to significant increases efficient land 
management and access to finance in Communal Areas is doubtful. 
The issue of group control of grazing lands versus 
individualisation appears to have been inadequately addressed, 
let alone to have received anything close to popular debate.
Moreover, much NGO and stat technical assistance has been 
provided through producer cooperatives, group gardens suggesting 
that the convince of larger land holdings and grouped 
mobilisation are basic current Communal Areas rural development 
strategies. Poor performance in many cooperatives and inadequate 
returns on group gardens place doubts on either on the strategy 
of group land management, or on .the adequacy of related support, 
and/or on the acceptability of group land tenure rights. This is 
need through assentation.8
6 C. Nhira (1991)
7 Murphree (1990)
8 B. Cousins (1989)
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4.4 Land Tenure Problems in Resettlement Areas
Generally, since the current Model A resettlement scheme 
reproduces Communal Area landholding, most of tenurial problems 
discussed above apply there as well. In addition Resettlement 
Areas (R.A.) are encumbered by the lack of a social basis for 
their landholdings as the GOZ reserves the right to cancel 
settler permits. The main problems of land insecurity here 
include:
i) the lack of leases or title to land, and the security of 
temporary permits;
ii) the finality of Resettlement Officer authority of over 
landuse regulations;
iii) the holding of dual land rights by some settlers, in 
Communal Areas and the schemes;
iv) the appropriateness restrictions on households with employed 
spouses;
v) the efficiency of grazing landuse and therefore grazing land 
rights*;
vi) inheritance rights of offspring and relatives;
vii) land transfer rights, including sale of rights as happened 
in Sorti Source;
viii) the appropriateness of Model producer cooperative 
landholding, with particular regard to individualising 
cropping lands*;
ix) the feasibility of alternative forms of land depasturing on 
state lands provided to Communal Area residents involved in 
Model D's.
x) the legal and administrative aspects of Resettlement land 
holding*;
xi) the justiciability or fairness of the process of settler 
selection and hence "free" land rights allocation amidst 
mass land hunger.
* The items with an asterisk reflect the main concerns of the 
proposed Land Tenure Commission of the GOZ.
4.5 Land Tenure Issues in the LSCF
A wide range of tenure queries, problems can be raised about the 
LSCF in particular by the GOZ and the public. Some of the 
problems centre around:
1. Farm Sizes
i) Are the average farm sizes of ca. 2 000 ha. especially in 
Natural Region I, II and III, the optimal maxima for 
individually managed forms (as opposed to truly corporate
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management of estates). What are the variations by finance 
mobilisation, labour and production controls, in terms of 
efficiency and utilisation of large average forms.
ii) How would optimum farm sizes vary among Natural Regions, 
given the changing technologies (e.g. irrigation and 
machines) and types of enterprise in demand (extensive land 
use such as: woodlands, wildlife, beef vis intensive field 
cropping vs. smaller scale horticultural crop areas
I feasible).
iii) Relatedly, is true corporate farm ownership (tenure) to be 
promoted, not as a search for tax havens (by urban 
companies) or for tax evasion by individual/household farm 
operators.
iv) Relatedly, what minimum farm sizes are to be regarded as 
"viable" for "commercial" farming purposes, in terms of de­
regulating sub-divisions or relating the administration of 
sub-division. Thus, what combination of income, output and 
land productivity targets constitute the threshold for 
minimum commercial farm sizes. What criteria are used to 
set targets and t combine factors? How do the thresholds 
vary among Natural Regions.
v) Implementation of problems if farm sizes were controlled.
2. Landuse/Farm Sizes
i) Is it desirable to control farm sizes as a means of enabling 
new present users to gain land access, rather than to 
postpone optimal/maximal landuse of total lands owned by 
private operators, and hence discouraging interim sub- 
optimal landuse strategies (wildlife?) by present owners.
ii) Is arable land efficiently used currently, and therefore a
basis for land "expropriation.^_________________________
iii) Is it necessary, desirable and feasible to directly control 
or direct landuse (through incentives, resales, land 
transfer) in order to achieve optimum landuse on a national 
scale as opposed to private,optimum.
3. Title/Leasehold
i) Is it necessary to apply leases only to "foreign" landusers? 
Can farm indigenous managers (black or white) be granted the 
tenure of such lands to secure a collateral base.
ii) Is it desirable to convert the whole LSCF tenure to long­
term leases, in order to facilitate future land transfers?
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iii) Is it desirable to grant leases the first right on payment 
full title to the current LSCF leasee's (2 million ha?) of 
GOZ lands in the LSCF. Or should new owners get it? Sub­
divide leasee's? Productive land? Case by case?
4. Legitimacy of Tenure
i) Is the current uneven land access politically acceptable or 
tolerable to the extent that future large-scale conflict can 
be averted? Has sufficient public consultation on this 
occurred.
ii) Are normative considerations and income distribution effects 
of land distribution absolutely justifiably grounds for 
compulsory land translate or is arable and other land under­
utilisation the critical factor for land transfer?
ii) If the latter applies/ what assessment criteria of land 
under-utilisation are relevant? Present land capability 
(output), land market demand (effective demand vs. GOZ 
assisted acquisition) and/or are minimum tax contributions 
(direct land tax and farm income) the route to assessing or 
judging land utilisation. Relatedly are crude methods of 
land t valuation/tax contributions acceptably means of 
deriving the above criteria or should massive studies, farm 
valuations and farmer returns form the basis for decisions. 
Who adjudicates these decisions or assessments (independent 
valuers and courts or state functionaries or farmer groups)?
5. Security of Tenure
i) Does the promised land designation and taxation engender 
tenure insecurity, to the extent of discouraging normal farm 
investments?
ii) Does poaching, cattle rustling and other conflict cause 
sufficient insecurity to individual farmers? If so, is the 
state prepared or able to provide "security forces" for 
farms or are farmers to mount own farm security forces? 
What is the extent and intensity of this problem?
4.6 Land Tenure Issues in State Lands (The Forestry Commission 
and Parks)
1. Legitimacy of Tenure
i) Forest Commission land is mostly GOZ owned land, managed by 
agreement under the FC Act. The general legitimacy of the 
GOZ owning/holding land (under capitalism) is at stake, in 
relation to broader political demands for land access.
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ii) The failure (volume) of LSCF based resettlement suggests 
increased resort to pressure on GOZ lands! Does this 
emphasize the legitimacy of state land distribution, or is a 
reflection of ineffective controls and political ambiguity 
within the GOZ.
iii) The apparently "under-utilised" F.C./Parks lands invites 
legitimate demands for access. Are such land sub-optimally 
used and if so is this sufficient basis for state land 
distribution.
iv) The new landuse opportunities (all Forestry Commission land 
utilisation projects) are suggestive of broad potentials for 
private sector use/access to GOZ (F.C./Parks) lands. Does 
this suggest a reason and basis of broadening private access 
to state lands?
v) Immediate land pressures by neighbouring communal areas 
farms suggests specific demands for GOZ lands. Squatters 
demand formalisation of settlement rights, as happened under 
the "accelerated resettlement" schemes. Which strategies 
are to be adopted by landed state institutions? Tighter 
control of resource sharing?
vi) Direct historically and legal based land evictions on pieces 
of GOZ land, impose possibilities for land demands and 
litigation. Are land claims to be entertained only on state 
lands? If so how are these to be re-compensate.
vii) Security of tenure through poaching and unsystematised 
demands for F.C. lands, are the major problem facing the 
Forestry Commission.
2. Title Leases
i) The F.C./Parks required "secure" title or leases. Should 
these be provided and under what conditions when they 
contribute to taxes from institutional income and land 
taxation.
3. Landuse
i) There is similar demand for optimum land-utilisation under 
state lands and the subjection of these lands to valuation, 
taxes, as well as competition. What strategies are required 
to address these demands.
ii) More joint-tenure relationships are indicated by new 
ventures and resource-sharing projects. Pioneered by the 
Forestry Commission should these be promoted as a basis for 
secure tenure.
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iii) Scattered sub-leasing of F.C./Parks lands under remote 
supervision may be desirable.
iv) Interim land use optimisation dynamic strategies, prior to 
plantation development are a rationale and legitimate 
activity by state lands.
v) The venture pioneering and management developmental role of 
the F.C. is legitimate as an intermediary and interim 
process of rural development.
4. Incomes Utilisation
i) Visible sharing of profits for rural development via land 
taxes, services, development financing, may be the major 
route to securing tenure legitimacy, civil protection of 
F.C. resources and the role of the state. What prospects 
exist for resource sharing.
Broadly speaking, the GOZ has tended to be vague and ambiguous in 
ascertaining the tenurial rights of state institutions. Rather 
the thrust has been to extol the benefits from tourism and 
environmental ethics. With a vague land distribution policy and 
contradictions such as those found in the Communal Areas above, 
this has opened state lands to pressures.
4.7 Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas
The SSCF Areas represent a tenurial enigina, since sufficient 
attention has not been directed at the long under-utilisation and 
poor economic performance of these areas notwithstanding the 
historic neglect by the colonial states, in terms of support to 
these areas. Moreover greater attention seems appropriate given 
the GOZ announcement of it's policy desire to promote black 
commercial farming. The SSCF are the main source of freehold and 
leasehold tenure among Zimbabwean farming blacks. The problems 
and experiences in the SSCF can critically inform current 
policies for developing black agrarian capitalists.
Surprisingly, official focus on tenure problems in the SSCF is 
restricted to the following:9
i) That the majority of forms are still held under leasehold, 
when they were intended to pass on to freehold tenure, given 
the options to purchase provided in leases.
9 See the draft terms of reference for the proposed Land 
Tenure Commission.
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ii) That only the actual leasee's entitled to the land, such 
that transferability, sub-letting and sub-contracting are 
restricted.
iii) Inheritance rights are obscure.
iv) That cemeteries require centralisation, since the perceived 
spiritual implications farm based cemeteries restricts land 
ownership transfers.
v) That alternative tenurial options need to be recommended.
vi) That productivity has declined.
In fact many SSCF areas have been defacto sub-divided among 
extended families, and farm investments seem to have been on the 
decline.
5.0 GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE PROBLEMS
A key issue arising out of the above discussion is the lack of a 
comprehensive and clear policy position on land tenure, hence the 
proposed setting-up of a commission. The diverse nature of the 
problems have been noted on a sub-sectoral basis. The proposed 
land tenure policy is also intended to be circumscribed by the 
broad land policy pronouncements or principles, such as:10
i) balancing equity, productivity and sustainability;
ii) employment creation;
iii) increased agricultural production;
iv) promoting equitable land distribution;
v) increasing exports and forex earnings;
vi) promotion of emergent black large-scale commercial farmers;
vii) achievement and maintenance of domestic food self- 
sufficiency.
The relationship of land tenure_poTicy to land tax proposals and 
land designation for resettlement is not alluded to in the terms 
of reference of the proposed land commission.
Currently it is only possible in this section to outline some 
broad guidelines to a future land policy and to inter on the 
position to be adopted by state landholding institutions such as 
they Forestry Commission. The following aspects are recommended:
1. The removal of all policy ambianties identified earlier.
2. The clarification of land tax and land distribution policy.
3. Developing a unimodal land tenure system.
10 Terms of Reference of the proposed Land Commission.
29
4. Reducing the role of central government in land control.
5. Strengthening local land controls through institutional 
support and land development investments.
In addition the following issues would be of relevance in 
resolving the land tenure problem:
5.1 Land Markets
i) Institutional consolidation of land valuation, surveying and 
farm planning skills and systems for use in land prices, 
taxes and incomes assessment.
ii) Formulation of an effective real land tax system and rates, 
capital gains taxation and agricultural income tax review.
iii) Create a system and professional basis for land use 
potential assessments, farming systems design, land purchase 
identification and sales negotiations, in order to maximise 
the quantity and use of land to be acquired.
iv) Promotion of competitive state and private real estate
agencies for the administration of land transfer.
v) Designing a land acquisition finance scheme, which
encompasses a variety of sources of finance ranging from
land tax revenues, communities, banks, individuals and 
donors.
vi) A  pervasive problem is the conflicting land demands for
settlement or housing vis-a-vis land demands for 
agricultural production. Land policy needs to ensure that 
an effective urban housing land transfer programme is
instituted in order to meet such needs, as distinguished
from farm land distribution. Moreover, there is need to 
regulate the impact of urban land market prices and
absorption of savings leading to the over-crowding of 
finance markets" by_fiTigh cost land demands, to the detriment 
of low-cost housing. Rural land prices in the peri-urban 
areas can trigger inflationary resettlement land costs and a 
chaotic land sub-division process.
5.2 Land Reform Administration
Within this context the main issue is to prevent potential 
institutional chauvinism between the relevant ministries and 
departments on the basis of clarified roles in land
redistribution. Such ministries or departments and roles which 
need definition include:
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Organisations Roles and Responsibilities
A. Government 
Organisations
1. Finance
2. Economic Planning
3. Agriculture
4. Local Government
5. Social Services
6. Surveyor/Deeds
7. Social Mobilisation
8. Other Support 
services
Budgeting
Macro-economic targets 
Extension Services, Technical/Physical 
Planning, Agricultural Policy, 
Marketing, Credit, Inputs 
Local Area Administration, Land 
Allocation, Local Planning 
Health, Education, Water, Housing, etc. 
Land Registration, Tilling, etc.
Groups, Community and Cooperative 
Organisation
Information, Research, Advisory 
Services
B. NGOs
Various Support 
Services
Finance, Training, Community 
Organisations, Specialist Services
C. Research Institutions Monitoring, Data Processing, 
Evaluation and Policy Evolution
D. Farmer Organisations Problem articulation and lobby
Apart from the clarification of roles, open debate and
participatory approaches to the design of the overall and 
specific issues for land redistribution will be crucial. These 
will include land selection, settler selection, scheme design, 
enterprises design, financing and administrative mechanisms
design.
5.3 Planning and Technical Considerations
An innovative participatory system of formulating resettlement 
models based on viable farming system concepts and appropriate 
production mixes will be required. The objective should be to 
move away from pseudo-environmentalist notions of low-input, 
subsistence-oriented physical planning preoccupations found among 
Southern African rural planners. The specific dryland conditions 
and the predominance of livestock in peasant and indeed the 
national economy will need a thoroughly participatory planning 
process to achieve sustainable goals.
5.4 Economic Considerations
Most important will be not to set false targets and expectations 
of resettlement projects through the following issues:
i) Mixing social services and administrative costs of
resettlement into the agricultural components of schemes
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during the assessment of cost-benefits.
ii) Ensuring adequate credit and other support services are 
planned for schemes in order to guarantee output and 
potential productivity.
iii) The establishment, operation and maintenance of resettlement 
as well as the realisation of intended impacts require at 
least five average seasons or years. Developing appropriate 
time planning horizons for the realisation of output levels 
in the context of full settler farm establishment 
requirements.
5.5 Socio-Political Aspects
Land reform should not be based only on autonomous rational state 
policy formulation processes, but on adequate consideration of 
popular expectations, among various classes (including 
influential middle classes) through a deliberative consultative 
process throughout the various phases of the programme. Issues 
such as land tenure, rights, financing resettlement, pricing land 
for acquisition, arbitration of land sales disputes, settler 
selection and purposes of land reform require thorough debate and 
consultation of various power structures and organisations.
In conclusion, the above issues can only be of relevance to 
Namibia, if and when they are based on thorough analysis of the 
specific conditions prevailing there. This conference provides a 
forum for such specific analyses.
6.0 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
WHAT F.C. COULD DO ABOUT TENURE ISSUES:
The following broad proposals are recommend:
6.1 Contribution to National Solutions:
a) Planning, monitoring + participating - commission o.k. 
(designing), (data).
b) Reveal potentials + access possibilities.
c) Do not hold' onto unnecessary land?
d) Push land tax as a driver of problem.
e) Expose squatting problems data, pressures etc.
f) Clarify externalities related to landuses + role of tenure.
6.2 Actions/Possibilities on Own Land:
a) Disposal of some land in 10 years.
b) Defenise - strategies
c) Resource-sharing strategies) publicise these strategies.
d) Efficient use of own resource: show why F.C. is the best
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user.
e) Clarify present uses + plans investments.
6.3 Support to other Lands:
Basically the Forestry Commission should provide technical 
and management support for woodlands development where 
feasible and required in Communal Areas, SSCF areas and LSCF 
areas. In particular the Communal Areas need resource 
sharing and support as outlined in later sections. This 
strategy may secure the longer term land tenure security of 
the Forest Commission.
7.0 CONCLUDINGS
The more specific alternative solutions to the land tenure 
position of the Forestry Commission are provided in other 
chapters following this.
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